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., as well as 1 (falsehood constant) and T (truth-hood constant). Formulas are then built up in the usual way using A (and), v (or), D (implication), -(negation), [] (necessity) and > (possibility).
Such a generous syntax requires a large number of rules of derivation in the linear reasoning system. These rules fall into a relatively small number of families, which can be presented succinctly using Smullyan's device of uniform notation [9] , [10], which we have extended to the modal case [4] , [5] . Nonatomic formulas are grouped into four classes: conjunctions (a-formulas), disjunctions (fl-formulas), necessitations (v-formulas) and possibles (7r-formulas). For each type, one or two components are specified; thus an a-formula has two components, a, and a2, while a v-formula has one component, vo. The classes, and the corresponding components, are specified in the following tables. We will need the notion of a positive occurrence of subformula. Informally the idea is this. An occurrence of a subformula Y in X is a positive one if, when X is rewritten in standard ways to translate away instances of a, then the (rewritten) occurrence of Y will be within the scope of an even number of -instances. A more formal characterization follows.
1) The only occurrence of X in the formula X is positive. Our linear reasoning systems are correct and complete with respect to appropriate Kripke models. We do not introduce a notation for them, since we will not be needing it in this paper. In [5] the reader can find a presentation of Kripke models that makes use of the uniform notational scheme given above.
The logics we will be considering here are quite standard and can be quickly characterized in terms of the accessibility relation of the corresponding Kripke model theory, as follows. ( In the statement of the rules below, X is any single formula, and S, S1, S2 are finite sequences of formulas. We writeS, X for the sequence consisting of the terms of S, followed by X; and similarly for S,, S2 It is quite straightforward to check that, for any instance of a Phase I or Phase IV rule, the premise formula (above the line) and the conclusion formula (below the line) are equivalent in K. The same is the case with Rule S. Also trivially, for Phase II and Phase III rule instances, the premise implies the conclusion in K. It then follows from the two results cited above that in any derivation in the system of ?3, each line must imply the next in K. Indeed, except where Phase II or Phase III rules are involved, each line will be equivalent to the next.
It follows that if P D Q is provable then P D Q must be K-valid, so the system is correct.
For showing completeness, rather than constructing a proof from the beginning, we make use of the model existence theorem for K, which we state but do not prove here (see [ Now we are ready to prove the completeness of the linear reasoning system for K. Let S be a finite set of signed formulas. By a partition of S we mean two disjoint sets Si and S2 such that S = Si u S2. Now, let us call a finite set S of signed formulas consistent provided, for some partition S1, S2 of S, there is no derivation of VT2from AS1. Let C be the collection of all such consistent sets. We claim C is a Kconsistency property. There are several cases that must be checked to verify this claim. We consider one in detail, involving a fl-signed formula.
Suppose neither S u {fl } nor S ul {fl2} is consistent; we show S u {fl} is also not consistent. To do this we must consider every partition of S u {fl}, and this leads to two subcases depending on which part of the partition contains the fl-formula. Finally we mention modifications suitable for GL, the modal logic of provability in Peano arithmetic. For this it is convenient to define an unsigned conjugation, just for v-and 7t-formulas, as follows.
Now, for GL, use the K4-system given above, but replace the rules 1-7t and IV-v by the following. ?6. First order logics. First order version of the logics we have been considering can be specified axiomatically or semantically. Both versions are fairly standard. Axiomatically, one adds the "usual" modal axioms and rules for the particular logic to a "standard" axiomatization of classical first order logic. Semantically one uses Kripke models with a classical first order structure (appropriate for the language) associated with each possible world, subject to the monotonicity condition, that any member of the domain of the structure associated with a world is also in the domain of the structure associated with any accessible world. See [5] for proper formulations that make use of the system of uniform notation adopted in the present paper. Correctness and completeness results are well known for K, T, K4, S4, D and D4, and all trace back to [7] .
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We omitted GL from the list of logics above because we do not know of a good semantic characterization of a first order version of it.
The Barcan formula states (Vx) DA(x) v D(Vx)A(x). Adding it to an axiomatic formulation of one of the present logics is equivalent to imposing the semantic constant domain condition: that the classical structures associated with the various possible worlds all must have the same domains. It is known [3] that such logics do not have the interpolation property, and we do not provide linear reasoning systems for them.
In this section we do provide linear reasoning systems for quantified K, T, K4, S4, D and D4, without the Barcan formula, and we sketch proofs of correctness and completeness. The interpolation theorem for these logics then follows easily.
We note that by adding the quantifier rules of this section to the propositional GL rules given earlier, we do get a first order GL linear reasoning system. We do not know if it is equivalent to an axiomatically formulated first order GL. Without an appropriate model theory available, any equivalence proof would be syntactic in nature. It seems like an interesting problem.
Just as we were generous in our choice of propositional connectives, here we take both V (universal) and 3 (existential) quantifiers as basic. We assume formulas are built up in the usual way. We assume an infinite list of constant symbols is available. We refer to constant symbols as parameters. We use the term statement to mean formula without free variables (though parameters may be present). All lines of proofs will be statements.
Still following [9] and [10] we use uniform notation for quantifiers. The yformulas (universals), the 3-formulas existentialls, and their instances are specified in the tables below. In stating them we use the following notational convention. A(x) represents a formula with some (possibly none) free occurrences of the variable x, and A(t) represents the result of replacing, in A, all free occurrences of x by occurrences of t (where t is a parameter or a variable). If y(x) is an allowed instance of a y-formula, (Vx)y(x) and y are equivalent. Similarly, if 3(x) is an allowed instance of a 3-formula, (3x)b(x) and 3 I-VAC a vacuous quantifier can be added.
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IV-VAC a vacuous quantifier can be dropped.
There are certain restrictions on these rules. First, in 1-3, the 6(x) must be an allowed instance of 3, and the variable x must not occur free in S or b. [Free variables are possible because these rules state what replacements are allowed within statements; the "context" in which the replacement takes place supplies the binding quantifiers.] Similarly in IV-y, y(x) must be an allowed instance of y, and x must not occur free in S or y. Second, in I-y and IV-3, the rule can only be applied to statements to yield statements. This means the "t" displayed must be either a parameter, or a variable that is within the scope of a quantifier. And further, if t is a variable, the instance must be an allowed one. Finally, in applying the Phase III rule stated in ?3, the result must be a statement-that is, any disjuncts added by this rule must be in contexts that quantify their free variables.
We present an example of a derivation using these rules. The particular example chosen does not involve modal features; it was meant to illustrate only the quantifier rules. In it, R is a 2-place relation symbol, and we give a linear proof of (3x)(Vy)R(x, y) A (Vy)(3x)R(x, y). We note again that we have not established completeness of a quantified GL system-we have no appropriate model existence theorem to use.
Interpolation theorems are again a byproduct, but the argument is a little more complicated than it was in the propositional case. Just as we argued in ?3, the statement at the end of Phase II of a derivation will be implied by the first line, and will imply the last. Also any predicate symbols present in such a statement must occur in all earlier and all later lines, and hence in the first and last lines. This is established by the same argument that worked for propositional variables earlier. On the other hand, rule 1-3 requires the binding quantifier "instantiating" the 6 to be within the same modal operators that 3 itself is. That is, if something exists at a certain world, we cannot conclude it existed at any earlier one, something which would correspond to having the binding existential quantifier for 3(x) outside one or more modal operators covering 3(x).
Thus the form of the I-y rule suggests that models will obey the monotonicity condition, but the form of the 1-3 rule suggests that they will not be constant domain.
We proved completeness with an appeal to the model existence theorem; the details of a model construction were not seen here. Were one to attempt a direct completeness proof, the ideas suggested above presumably could be used as a guide. The lines of an attempted proof of P D Q could be thought of as partial descriptions of a model in the way suggested. If the attempted proof "tries everything", enough material should be generated to construct a counter-model.
The second issue we wish to raise is the possibility of a syntactic completeness argument. That is, it should be possible to give a proof-theoretic argument that establishes the equivalence of one of our linear systems and the corresponding axiomatic version. As usual, the chief difficulty is modus ponens. One needs an analog of cut elimination for linear systems. Specifically, one needs the following.
Suppose we have a linear derivation of Q from P, in the system for logic L, and we also have a linear derivation of R from Q. If we simply write down the steps of the first derivation and follow them by those of the second, we obtain what we might call a pseudo-derivation of R from P. Each line still follows from the previous one in a reasonable sense. But it is no longer a proper derivation, because we have lost the feature that all Phase I rule applications must preceed all Phase II rule applications, etc. The completeness proof for L says there must be a proper derivation of R from P. The question is, can a proper derivation of R from P be constructed by purely syntactic means, starting with a pseudo-derivation of R from P? This has obvious similarities with the issue of normalization in natural deduction.
If there is a syntactic means of converting pseudo-derivations into derivations that works for the first order linear GL system, it would amount to a proof that such a system is equivalent to an axiomatically formulated first order GL.
Based on the discussion earlier in this section, a plausible attempt at producing constant domain linear reasoning systems would be to replace the 1-3 and IV-y rules by ones allowing the binding quantifier to be outside the scope of some modal operators. Presumably such a system would not be complete. If a syntactic completeness argument is developed, as suggested in the previous paragraph, it would be interesting to see where it breaks down for the extended versions of I-6 and IV-y.
